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Abstract: 
Agency theory has been widely used in the franchising literature. This theory analyzes the contract relation-
ships between the principal and agent and has been mostly applied to franchising in traditional sectors (e.g., res-
taurants, retailing, or travel agencies) where the processes and procedures can be easily standardized. Recently, 
there has been a spectacular development of high-intensity knowledge sectors, especially in the health sector 
(dentists, opticians, physiotherapists etc.), where many companies choose franchising to expand the network and 
improve the survival rates of franchisees, although this strategy goes against the traditional view of the agency 
theory.
In this work, we propose to study this “new agency problem”, using the franchising business model as our 
research field. The know-how in high-knowledge-intensive sectors is difficult to codify and transfer, and it opens 
new possibilities for resource-based and intellectual capital perspectives to explain how knowledge assets are 
built into contracts in franchisor-franchisee relationships. Using resource-based theory and an intellectual ca-
pital perspective, we develop propositions on how to handle the knowledge transfer more efficiently. From this 
point of view, we propose an interorganizational dynamic contract to provide a more efficient knowledge transfer, 
thereby contributing to the success of the franchise networks as well as reducing the failure rates of franchisees’ 
outlets. 
Keywords:
Franchise, agency theory, entrepreneurship, resource-based view.
Resumen:
La Teoría de la Agencia está ampliamente extendida en la literatura sobre el modelo de negocio de la fran-
quicia. Desde la misma se analiza el contenido del contrato que gestiona la relación entre Principal y Agente 
en actividades y procesos fácilmente estandarizables (restauración, comercio minorista, agencias de viaje, etc.). 
No obstante, durante los últimos 10 años ha habido un espectacular desarrollo de ese modelo empresarial hacia 
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sectores más intensivos en conocimiento (dentistas, ópticas, fisioterapia, etc.) que cuestiona algunos de los pos-
tulados básicos de la teoría, limitando las posibilidades de desarrollo y supervivencia del proyecto.
En este trabajo revisamos el “nuevo problema de agencia” de Agencia que surge cuando un emprendedor 
franquicia una actividad intensiva en Capital Intelectual. Consideramos que las actividades que se realizan en 
estos sectores presentan una complejidad tal que hace difícilmente codificable y transmisible todos sus aspectos, 
por lo que el uso de los Contratos típicos de Agencia puede quedar muy limitado. Por ello, a partir del marco 
de la Teoría de Recursos y Capacidades planteamos un conjunto de proposiciones que sugieren un contrato 
dinámico interorganizacional y donde la efectiva transferencia de conocimientos entre las partes se convierte en 
un aspecto clave. En última instancia las contribuciones del mismo permitirán reducir las tasas se disolución de 
esos proyectos.
Palabras clave:
Franquicia, teoría de la agencia, emprendimiento, teoría de recursos y capacidades.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Franchising can be seen as a contract for a period of time in which the owner of a trade-
mark (franchisor) gives an entrepreneur or an organization (franchisee) the right to operate 
under its brand in exchange for an entry fee and royalties (Caves and Murphy 1976). The 
result of this agreement is the provision by an establishment of a service whose value is 
perceived by the customer as equal to, or higher than a similar one offered under other 
business models (Christopher 1996). Given the survival rates recorded under this model, it 
can be treated as a valid alternative for the creation and development of enterprises (Ayling 
1988; Castrogiovanni et al. 1993; Michael and Combs 2008). In recent years, the volume 
of activity generated under the franchise formula has experienced a boom and growth 
worldwide. For 2016, an increase in turnover of 5.8% is expected, with a remarkable rise 
being anticipated especially in the hotels and restaurants (6.3%), products and retail ser-
vices (6.4%), and logistics (6.6%) sectors (IFA 2016). Franchising is similarly important in 
Spain, where according to the latest edition of the Franchisors’ White Book (AEF 2015), 
there are over 64,000 franchise outlets, 250,000 direct jobs, a turnover of about 26,000 mil-
lion euros, and an activity level that has increased by more than 120% in the last 10 years.
There are several reasons that seem to explain the rise and development of the franchis-
ing business model:
• It allows the franchisor to expand and enter new markets more quickly.
• It allows the entrepreneur to create a business and achieve self-employment while 
taking lower risks.
Although franchising is not the only alternative for an entrepreneur, the truth is that in 
many sectors it enjoys great popularity, especially in the retail and hostelry sectors (Alon 
et al. 2012; Croonen and Brand 2013; Hua and Dalbor 2013). Despite that success, with 
the recent expansion of this business model towards less conventional sectors, especially, 
which are called “intellectual capital intensive sectors” (IC) (Pena 2002), such as physio-
therapy, dentistry, and counseling, certain limits are becoming clear.
Some of the limits than can appear arise from disagreements with regard to the tasks 
that each of the parties must assume, the duration of the contract, and the mechanisms for 
knowledge transfer. Ultimately, these aspects can lead to situations in which undertakings 
under the franchise formula make the franchising option a riskier choice (Bates 1995).
Indeed, from an agency theory perspective (AT), a franchise is described as one agent 
(franchisee) conducting an activity and paying the principal (franchisor) an entry fee and 
some royalties. The principal indoctrinates, delegates, and organizes the work. Meanwhile, 
the franchisee has the right to exploit the franchisor’s business model for a period of time 
and under certain conditions (Lafontaine 1992; Pardo-del-Val et al. 2014.). However, the 
static and economic position in which the AT lies cannot address other situations in which 
there are activities where part or all of the most valuable resources are in the possession of 
the franchisee (Gonzalez-Diaz and Solis-Rodriguez 2012), and those resources and capa-
bilities are dynamic (Blut et al. 2011). Some of these resources are classified as intangible 
or intellectual capital (human, structural, and relational) (Petty and Guthrie 2000; Watson 
and Stanworth 2006). Ultimately, that dissonance in the content and duration of the con-
tract can cause major problems between the parties and, as a result, a premature dissolution 
(Ring and Van de Ven 1994).
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Therefore, the aim of this study is to predict the agency problems (APs) that can arise 
when an entrepreneur starts an IC activity using the franchising business model and pro-
pose alternatives to identify and overcome those problems. To that end, we will review the 
main literature related to this topic and seek solutions provided by a resource-based view 
of the firm (RBV), whose basic postulates argue that the results of companies are different 
because of the different endowments and combinations that they have. As a result of this 
analysis we put forward a set of propositions that suggest, with certain organizational as-
sumptions, the need for a new, more flexible, and cooperative conceptual model between 
the parties.
2. THEORICAL FRAMEWORK
2.1. Review of agency theory in franchising business model
The AT became popular in the 1970s with the work of Ross (1973), Caves and Murphy 
(1976), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Fama and Jensen (1983a and 1983b). This theory 
emerged as one that motivates companies to separate the ownership and control of the com-
pany. It is considered to be a multidisciplinary theory that is able to be used for other fields 
such as accounting, economics, finance, marketing, political science, and behavior among 
organizations or societies (Eisenhardt 1989; Cuevas-Rodríguez et al. 2012), and is defined 
as “an agency relationship by which one party, the principal, delegates work elsewhere, to 
the agent, to carry out this work”(Eisenhardt 1989, p.58).
The work of Ross defines the agency relationship as “a relationship that arises between 
two parties when a designated agent acts as or on behalf of the other, the designated prin-
cipal, in one aspect of decision making” (1973, p.134). In addition, under an economic 
approach it exposes the reasons why, acting in perfect market conditions, it is feasible to 
separate the management of the company’s property.
Later, Jensen and Meckling define the agency relationship as being under “a contract 
in which the principal commits the agent to develop an activity in favor of this, delegating 
decision-making and authority to the agent” (1976, p.308), and establish that the agency 
costs are the sum of the costs for the design and formalization of the contracts, the costs of 
monitoring the agent, the bond, and those associated with the residual loss. Moreover, in 
their study they refine aspects such as the optimal size of the outlet, the costs of hiring the 
agent, and the costs of the tracking or monitoring of agent activity.
In 1983, Fama and Jensen (1983a and 1983b) gave the AT a legal approach. In these 
works, they develop the main aspects on which the agency agreement between the parties 
(Fama and Jensen 1983a) is negotiated. Among them, they consider that some aspects can 
lead to negotiations between the principal and agent; these issues are decentralized deci-
sion making, supervision of the principal’s demands, and establishing flexible rules. In a 
later work, these authors establish the main mechanisms to reduce the APs that may arise 
between the parties (Fama and Jensen 1983b).
For AT, the main unit of analysis is the contract established between the parties, which 
are linked. AT looks for a relationship that is as efficient as possible between the principal 
and agent, whether they are individuals, organizations, or information (Eisenhardt 1989). 
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The main obstacles that must be addressed to optimize this contract are the APs and risk 
sharing (RS).
This theory has been used to argue many aspects that are based on two or more actors, 
such as a business model franchise (Shane 1998), separation of ownership and control 
(Letza et al. 2004), mergers and acquisitions, opportunistic behavior between managers 
and subordinates (El-Akremi et al. 2010; Mellewight et al. 2011), or an associated enter-
prise (Michael and Combs 2008; Salar and Salar 2014).
2.2.  The entrepreneur as franchisee from an agency theory perspective
Authors like Venkataraman define the entrepreneur as “a person who analyzes the how, 
who and with what effect to create future goods or services that can be discovered, eval-
uated and exploited” (1997, p.120). This conception of the entrepreneur implies that aca-
demics should, among other things, study the sources of the opportunities developed by en-
trepreneurs and the way they exploit those opportunities (Shane and Venkataraman 2000).
The entrepreneur and his or her actions have been studied in the franchising sector 
from different perspectives. For example, the theory of resources and capabilities (Flad-
moe-Lindquist 1996; Juste et al. 2006; Alon et al. 2012; Michael 2014), scarcity resource 
theory (Combs et al. 2011a; 2011b; Hua and Dalbor 2013), transaction costs theory and the 
theory of the firm (Rubin 1973 and 1978; Michael and Moore 1995; Baena 2010), social 
exchange theory (Altinay et al. 2014), structural inertia theory (Winter et al. 2012), and 
game theory (Desai 1997; Sigué and Chintagunta 2009).
Under AT studies have focused on the entrepreneurial franchisee (agent) suggesting 
that those entrepreneurs who are interested in that kind of business model are looking 
for activities that offer more guarantees and lower risk, even at the expense of a loss of 
independence and future profitability (Ayling 1988; Castrogiovanni et al. 1993; Michael 
and Combs 2008). The research by scholars such as Kaufmann (1999) and Kaufmann and 
Eroglu (1999) reflects this dichotomy between being an entrepreneur franchisee or not and 
proposes an integrative model that considers other aspects, such as individual and social 
aspects. Seawright et al. (2013) compared managers and entrepreneur-franchisees. They 
analyzed the attitudes of the managers of establishments owned by the chain and traditional 
entrepreneurs and came to the conclusion that franchisees have a profile more similar to a 
traditional manager than an entrepreneur; these franchisees exhibit a maximum commit-
ment to the chain but have lower skills than managers or independent entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneur who becomes a franchisee is involved in negotiating the franchise 
agreement. These contracts are born as a result of market opportunities (market-like qual-
ities) in which the franchisor develops a product or service that the franchisee put on the 
market, or they arise as a result of the franchisor’s market power (firm-like qualities), 
where this provides the franchisee with assistance in establishing the business (Norton 
1988).
Although some studies, like that of Mellewight et al. (2011), evaluate the results of 
contracts in terms of employee satisfaction, there are still significant gaps in respect of ex-
amples of premature dissolution and failure. In that vein, Gillis and Castrogiovanni (2012) 
suggest the use of new or expanded paradigms such as the RBV. In a similar vein are the 
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proposals made by Dant (2008), who argues that the research in this field must go beyond 
the study of the “McDonald’s effect” and should be expanded to different sectors such as 
hotels and restaurants; new explanations should be sought about the challenges that this 
business model is facing, such as the AP and RS.
2.3. The agency problem in franchising
In a franchise outlet, the AP arises when the objectives differ between the principal and 
agent. One aspect where this is most visible is in the so-called moral hazard; so to prevent 
this problem, the principal sets some restrictive clauses (Lafontaine 1992). There are at 
least two different types of moral hazard:
• One-sided moral hazard, in which the agent may want to take unfair advantage of 
knowledge made available by the principal;
• Two-sided moral hazard, in which either party can behave unfairly.
The other dissonance arises from the so-called adverse selection, which is produced 
when the principal detects that the agent is lacking in a number of the skills needed to per-
form the task or function (Eisenhardt 1989).
The AP, whether it be either moral hazard or adverse selection, has been demonstrated 
and its effects studied on many aspects. These aspects include the origin of the relationship 
between organizations (Caves and Murphy 1976; Gillis and Castrogiovanni 2012), with re-
gard to coordination mechanisms for compensation and financing (Sen 1993; Wimmer and 
Garen 1997; Vázquez 2005; Gonzalez-Diaz and Solis-Rodriguez 2012), the duration and 
optimization of the agency contract (Shane 1998; Vázquez 2007), the control mechanisms 
on performance (El Akremi 2010; Mellewigt et al. 2011), the risks in the relationship (La-
fontaine 1992; Michael and Combs 2008), and the propensity to franchise by franchisors 
(Lafontaine 1992; Barthélemy 2011; Seawright et al. 2013). In general, the literature con-
cludes that to overcome the AP in a franchise outlet, it is important to identify these risks 
at an early stage, even before the business commences. For this task, the key element is 
to obtain a good evaluation of the parties. However, we argue that these are short range 
recommendations, since most studies have been carried out only from the point of view of 
the principal and only in respect of sectors that are traditionally franchised.
2.4. The risk sharing in franchising
The other problem that exists under the AT is the RS, which is based on the simultaneous 
perception of the both principal and agent (i.e., an asymmetric risk sharing), so there is no 
assumption that all of the risks are known before the start of the activity. Thus, if any of the 
parties observe inequalities, RS can cause individualistic behavior, either because one of the 
parties can benefit unilaterally from the knowledge provided in the agency relationship to end 
the relationship (free riding), or by the premature abandonment or withdrawal of the agency 
relationship (hold-up) (Vazquez 2007). The negative effects of this tension have been studied 
in respect of the quality of service offered by the franchisor (Grace and Weaven 2011) or in 
the image and value of the franchised trademark (Nyadzayo et al. 2015).
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Indeed, although the franchise agreement simultaneously reduces the risk to both par-
ties of an exchange of resources and capabilities, evaluating them and their future devel-
opment are more complex to implement. For this purpose, franchisors set broadly based 
royalties, whether they be fixed or variable or a combination of both (Lafontaine and Bhat-
tacharyya 1995). In other cases, franchisors set profiles and clauses requiring franchisees 
to have certain training, experience, and a unique active involvement in the project (not 
only as investors) in exchange for some autonomy and the fixing of the franchise territory 
(Michael and Combs 2008). On the other hand, Windsperger and Dant (2006) address this 
issue from the aspect of property rights theory, which affirms that the more difficult it is to 
articulate aspects of the relationship in the contract, the more influence the franchisee gets 
once they have learned the know-how of the company. Therefore, the relationship estab-
lished between the parties will depend on the ability to specifically capture the content of 
the relationship, and this will vary according to the difficulty of defining, codifying, and 
teaching these matters for purposes of the contract (Zander and Kogut 1995). In any case, 
the emergence of a need to go beyond some new franchised realities (activities) may be 
evidence of unforeseen situations that require further investigation.
3. THE AGENCY PROBLEMS AND RISK SHARING IN INTELLECTUAL CAPI-
TAL INTENSIVE SECTORS
The traditional franchise has involved an agency relationship in which the fran-
chisor provides mainly the “know-how”, technical assistance, and brand image, while 
the franchisee provides the work and local market knowledge (Gasset 1992). The AT 
also states that although there is a cooperative relationship between the parties, there is 
an asymmetry of power whose origin lies in the different resourcing and capabilities2 
 possessed by each party (Norton 1988 Hossain and Wang 2006). This difference in endow-
ments, which can be dynamic but linear, is managed with an entry fee and royalties that are 
disbursed over time.
With the wider use of the strategy of cooperation by companies and the implementation 
of franchising in other sectors that are more intensive in knowledge activities, new realities 
and challenges have emerged that require new management capabilities (Vazquez 2005). 
These new sectors can be characterized by different dimensions, such as the scope of ac-
tivity (local or international) and the volume of investment or knowledge. From the latter 
perspective, Pena (2002) differentiates sectors by intensive and non-intensive IC3. There 
are three IC components (Stewart and Ruckdeschel 1997; Petty and Guthrie 2000; Watson 
and Stanworth 2006): human capital, structural capital, and relational capital.
2 We understand resources to be the “aspects (tangible or intangible) that are available to a company or organization” 
(Wernerfelt 1984, p.172), and we also refer to skills and competences that belong to each of the parties. As Teece et 
al. (1997) stated, we prefer to consider resources as “specific assets of the organization.” However, we use the word 
resource to be consistent with the existing literature.
3 We do not have to confuse Intellectual Capital (IC) with Knowledge Management (KM). Although both concepts 
are based on the value of information, KM is the tool used by organizations to control and distribute the IC (Petty 
and Guthrie 2000, p.159).
New challenges in franchisor-franchisee relationship.  An analysis from agency theory perspective
Cuadernos de Gestión Vol. 18 - Nº 1 (2018), pp. 85-102 ISSN: 1131 - 683792
With this approach (Figure 1), human capital in a franchise comprises skills, experi-
ences, attitudes, ideas, and values. For the franchisor this dimension involves the training, 
knowledge, and skills they bring to the relationship, while the franchisee contributes with 
prior training, knowledge of the local market, and innovation in processes, royalties, and 
entry fees. An intensive IC franchisee brings its knowledge and experience, local market 
knowledge, and consistent royalties in securing the acquisition of the improvements made 
by the franchisor. Structural capital consists of the processes and infrastructure, with con-
tributions from the principal’s logistics support, marketing, and information. The agent’s 
contribution comprises the use of specialized and new techniques for improving the tasks. 
Relational capital is formed by the nature and quality of the relationships established in the 
business. For the franchisor, this dimension encompasses the contracts with suppliers, and 
for the franchisee, it encompasses the local brand development and the customer loyalty 
achieved.
Figure 1
Resources and capabilities provided by the parties in a franchising intellectual capital intensive 
relationship
Source: Own elaboration based on Watson and Stanworth (2006, p.345).
The higher the value of each of these components, the greater its contribution to the IC 
of the contract and, as a consequence, the greater the perceived value of the outlet4.
4The customer’s perceived value of the outlet is the resulting subjective balance of the transaction. When this is 
positive, it translates into a belief that the benefit has been greater than the cost of the acquisition (Christopher 1996). 
In B2B relationships, a positive perception is crucial to the success of the relationship between the companies.
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In non-intensive IC sectors, most of the IC is in the possession of the franchisor. For 
example, in hostelry and retailing, where there is standardization of processes, services, 
and structural and relational capital, in many cases with suppliers, it is very evident that the 
IC is basically in the hands of the principal (Dada and Watson 2012; Croonen and Brand 
2013). In addition, in those sectors where the differential IC of both parties is usually stable 
over time, it is the principal who develops the most innovations in the facilities and con-
tributes to a greater extent to increasing the perceived value of the outlet. The innovative 
role of the agent is reduced to following the guidelines established by the principal, so 
development of the IC is much neglected in these circumstances. In this case, the AP and 
RS are minimized with a contract containing safeguards to prevent unfair, opportunistic, 
or unexpected behavior.
Figure 2 depicts theoretically the evolution of the IC of the parties as two parallel lines. 
The IC franchisor shows a higher level due to their greater possession of IC and uses the 
royalties as a compensation mechanism for their input of IC. From a temporal point of 
view, the royalties paid by the franchisee throughout the entire relationship are expected to 
be proportionally constant.
Figure 2
Relation between franchisor and franchisee intellectual capital in traditional franchising sectors 
Source: Own elaboration.
In contrast (Figure 3), in intensive IC sectors it is much more difficult to standardize 
activities and processes and the contribution to the perceived value of the outlet by the 
franchisee is much greater and more significant (Marie Doherty et al. 2014; Nyadzayo et 
al. 2015). Although the resources provided by the franchisor have a very high value at the 
beginning of the relationship, and franchisees pay royalties for that (the franchisor provides 
a recognizable brand, efficient processes, specific machinery, etc.), over time, after learn-
ing the necessary tasks we expect the agent will reduce its dependence on the franchisor to 
perform the work and theoretically also will be able to negotiate a reduction in the level of 
the royalties to balance the relationship. In the later stages, it can reach the situation where 
the franchisee has the highest IC contribution to the perceived value of the outlet (Watson 
and Stanworth 2006). In this case, we can expect a bigger AP and RS because the current 
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circumstances are not as they were when the original contract was negotiated and unfore-
seen behaviors cannot be avoided.
Figure 3
Relation between franchisor and franchisee intellectual capital in  IC intensive sectors 
Source: Own elaboration.
In short, according to our arguments we put forward the following proposals:
Proposal 1: A perceived IC franchise is not static, it alters as the relationship develops 
between the parties. 
Proposal 2: In establishing dynamic agency contracts, intensive IC franchises increase 
the chances of survival.
4. THE CHALLENGE OF INTELLECTUAL CAPITAL TRANSFER
At this point, it could be argued that the evolution of franchise contracts to more com-
plex sectors show the need for new contractual models where dynamism is a key aspect. 
Furthermore, in those franchises where the perceived value of the outlet may depend more 
on the franchisee than the franchisor, such as IC intensive sectors, new management mod-
els are needed when the transfer of the IC between the parties becomes a key aspect.
The issue of knowledge transfer in franchising is not new (Benavides et al. 2008; Cum-
berland and Githens 2012; Gorovaia and Windsperger 2013; Okoroafor 2014). One of the 
aspects that has received more interest has been the assistance or support provided by the 
franchisor to the franchisee (Hossein and Wang 2008). However, most of these studies 
analyze the existing barriers and methods for the transfer of knowledge from the franchisor 
to the franchisee, few studies have analyzed the importance of knowledge transfer between 
franchisees and from franchisees to franchisors (Dada and Watson 2010).
Benavides et al. (2008) establish three IC characteristics that the franchisee must know: 
it must be secret between the parties; it must be essential to the development of the core 
business of the franchise, and should be specific to each franchisor. In addition, these au-
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thors state that to bring about an effective knowledge transfer, an operating manual must 
be provided by the franchisor, the knowledge transfer must be both initial and periodic, and 
the franchisor must provide ongoing support to the franchisee; the latter is the most impor-
tant of all. Franchisees believe that the more knowledge is standardizable (encodable) the 
less relevance it will have to the production process and therefore the less benefit they will 
receive from it.
Meanwhile, Cumberland and Githens (2012) set some barriers to the tacit knowledge 
transfer5, which are confidence, maturity of the relationship, communication, competition, 
and the existing culture. Therefore, in order to overcome these barriers, the parties must 
learn from one another, they must have common goals to create a single business idea (i.e., 
the business is perceived as shared by the parties), they must reduce domestic competitive-
ness, and the franchisor should establish a culture to promote and share information with 
franchisees.
Gorovaia and Windsperger (2013) differentiate between the strategies for information 
transmission, distinguishing between systems with a high degree of information (HIR) and 
those with low levels of information (LIR). The first group includes conferences, meetings, 
or visits to establishments by the franchisee, while the second group would include mail 
communication, manuals, and reports. The results of this study conclude that the franchisor 
will use more HIR according to the tacitness of the knowledge to be transmitted; the confi-
dence between the parties plays an important role in knowledge transfer, and the more trust 
there is, the more systems with HIR are used.
In this regard, the advantages coming from the efficient transmission of IC between 
the franchisees themselves can positively affect the brand (Dada et al. 2010), giving rise 
to the image of the chain even being extended due to the reputation of its own workers 
(Watson and Stanworth 2006). Accordingly, some chains establish expensive mechanisms 
for transmitting knowledge that link franchisees and thereby enhance their image. The 
increase in the amortized costs, because of the difficulties in establishing mechanisms that 
are standardized within a chain franchise, can be offset to some degree by the need for less 
supervision (Hossein and Wang 2008).
An appropriate example of this issue is the dental franchises in Spain. These are busi-
nesses with a need for a very high level of IC for their daily work but the standardization 
of their processes is very similar to that required for other dental clinics. This is due to 
the need to use rigid protocols which, if they were not followed, would result in medical 
malpractice claims from aggrieved patients. The difference between this sector and other 
franchises traditionally lies in the demands and complexities required to replicate the pro-
cesses among the different units.
With IC intensive sectors, the contributions of human, structural, and relational capital 
that are provided by franchisors are susceptible, with the passage of time, to being assim-
ilated by the franchisee. When this occurs, the perceived value of the franchisor can stag-
nate and even reduce, thereby resulting in the emergence of various APs. To cope with this, 
5 Tacit knowledge is described as that knowledge that cannot be properly expressed in verbal terms. Explicit 
knowledge is the kind of knowledge that can be codified and transferred. The definitions of tacit knowledge and 
high IC are similar, so we will use them as synonyms for a better understanding of the text.
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various measures can be adopted, such as a review of royalties and, if necessary, a review 
of the agency relationship.
Therefore, at the contractual level, the franchisee continues to pay some royalties but 
as every moment passes he or she finds they are getting lower levels of performance from 
the IC franchisor, mainly because the franchisee has already absorbed most of this (Blut et 
al. 2011), whereas the franchisor has the ability to draw on the new capabilities developed 
by the franchisees at a minimal cost. In addition, the trademark of the franchisor can be 
complemented by the enhanced professional image, giving added value to the relational 
capital provided by the franchisee. Finally, the contributions of the IC by the two parties 
set the actual value of the outlet that is received by the franchisee.
Therefore, with the franchisee providing an IC similar to that provided by the fran-
chisor, we can consider the existence of a relationship that is effectively one of princi-
pal-principal when the relationship has reached a mature stage. In other words, although 
the franchisee could freely operate independently and avoid paying royalties, they could 
also choose to delegate to the franchisor some centralized activities such as marketing, 
procurement, recycling, and corporate image. This consideration has implications for the 
optimal configuration of the agency contract established between the parties (Ring and Van 
de Ven 1994). So far, most research on formulating the franchise agreement has been mo-
tivated to preserve the intangible heritage of the franchisor. However, the agency contract 
between the parties should include a part that envisages the collection in greater depth of 
intangible aspects (present or acquired during the contract) that should rightfully be owned 
by the franchisee and the entrepreneur.
Proposal 3: IC Intensive franchisors who encourage innovation in techniques and pro-
cedures among their franchisees and establish mechanisms for the transmission of these 
will increase the chances of survival of these establishments and therefore enhance the 
franchisor’s chain.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The aim of this study was to analyze and redefine the existing inter-relational frame-
work between the principal (franchisor) and the agent (franchisee), especially when the 
object of it is intensive in terms of intellectual capital activity. From that perspective we 
have questioned some of the basic tenets of the theory of the agency (AT) and, relying on 
the resource-based view (RBV), have shown some of its dysfunctionalities.
Although the more traditional approach of the franchise is based on an assumption 
of a symmetric and invariable relationship in time between the principal and agent, the 
emergence of new sectors and realities shows an agency problem (AP) that is derived from 
asymmetries and discontinuities that challenge the effectiveness of the model. When the 
entrepreneur franchisee possesses resources and idiosyncratic capabilities that are difficult 
for the franchisor to standardize, at a later stage of the relationship it can be more advanta-
geous to exploit these individually.
From this approach, we suggest that a first step to reduce the various problems that 
might arise in an agency relationship in these sectors is an adequate prior assessment of 
the resources available to the parties in order to establish clear and revisable guidelines in 
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the agency contract. It is a novel approach for franchising chains to consider agency rela-
tionships to be dynamic, but it can allow them access to key assets to compete successfully 
in these sectors that they would be unlikely to be able to acquire in another way. The role 
of franchisor managers in these businesses needs to be redefined. Indeed, whereas in the 
traditional model the franchisee is primarily a passive agent receiving the guidelines of 
the principal in a downward direction, in this new approach their role is more active and 
involves frequent interaction with the principal (franchisor), with knowledge being trans-
mitted upstream in many cases. Undoubtedly, the latter approach can be very beneficial to 
both parties as it can enable them to be able to incorporate new processes and technologies, 
to make the franchise labor element more competitive, and can increase confidence among 
the parties.
Other theories, such as the dynamic resources and skills and the property rights, could 
provide different measures to reduce the APs. For those problems that arise from unfair 
conduct (two-sided moral hazard), remedial measures would involve a comprehensive as-
sessment of the intellectual capital (IC) located in each of the parties, a mutual evaluation 
of these to give more balance to the relationship, and a sharing of the wealth of knowledge 
in both directions. With this measure the problem of adverse selection could be balanced to 
divide the power more evenly and thereby recognize the franchisor and franchisee skills. 
As for the problems associated with the risk sharing (RS) that must support the parties, 
franchisors should delegate more decision rights when it is difficult to replicate the intangi-
ble resources to reduce opportunistic behavior (free-riding) (Mumdžiev and Windsperger 
2011). To reduce the likelihood of the premature termination of the contract (hold-up), 
a guarantee could be feasible that allows the franchisee to belong to other professional 
groups or gives territorial continuity to the franchisee to enable collateral activities to be 
pursued (Chu and Liu 2010).
This study has some limitations that should be mentioned. The first and most notable 
is that it contains conceptual ideas that need to be proven empirically. The second limita-
tion is determined by the degree of difficulty that may be involved when evaluating some 
of the factors that have been described, such as the monitoring costs or effectiveness of 
the mechanisms of dissemination and knowledge transfer in chain establishments. Despite 
these limitations our work sheds some light on the uneven results of franchises among 
entrepreneurs and at the same time serves as a stimulus for further studies. Therefore, it 
is clear that future research work should be focused on the more IC intensive sectors with 
strong growth prospects, such as lawyers, dentists, physiotherapists, orthopedic specialists, 
and teaching academies and should study further the mechanisms for creating and improv-
ing confidence between the parties. In addition, it could also be of interest to study the 
mechanisms in these sectors for the transmission of knowledge horizontally, or between 
entrepreneurs (Dada et al. 2010), as well as vertically, or between entrepreneurs and cus-
tomers (Dant 2008).
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